This paper studies the e¤ects of allocation rules on the stability of mass tort class actions. I analyze a two-stage model in which a defendant faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage claims. In stage 1, the plainti¤s play a noncooperative coalition formation game. In stage 2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are litigated or settled. I examine how the method for allocating the class recovery interacts with other factors-the shape of the damage claim distribution, the scale bene…ts of the class action, and the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power in settlement negotiations-to determine the asymptotic stability of the global class. My results suggest criteria to attorney and courts for structuring and approving e¢ cient allocations plans in mass tort class actions and for evaluating the predominance and superiority requirements for class certi…cation in mass tort cases.
Introduction
A class action allows one or more representative parties to sue or be sued on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. Rule 23(b)(3) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a case to proceed as a class action when, inter alia, "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
In light of the general tradeo¤ between equity and e¢ ciency in matters of public policy and law (Okun 1975; Kaplow and Shavell 2002) , a class action that satis…es the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) would appear to be socially desirable.
A distinguishing feature of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is that the putative class members have the right to opt out of the class action and pursue their own interests (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)).
Advocates of opt-out rights o¤er various deontological and instrumental arguments in their favor. 1 Notwithstanding the merits of such arguments, the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action creates the risk that the class will unravel in spite of the fact that a class action is in society's best interests. This risk is acknowledged widely among class action scholars (e.g., Abraham 1987; Mullenix 1991; Perino 1997; Rosenberg 2002) , including by opt-out rights advocates (e.g. , Schuck 1995; Rutherglen 1996; Nagareda 2003a ).
The risk that the class will unravel is thought to be particularly signi…cant in the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action in which separate actions are viable (Co¤ee 1987; Bone 2003) . 2 Indeed, there is empirical evidence that opt-out rates are highest in mass tort cases (Eisenberg and Miller 2004b) . In recognition of the problem, several legal commentators propose restricting or even abolishing opt-out rights in mass tort class actions (e.g., Mullenix 1986; Co¤ee 1987; Rosenberg 2003) . Contrary to such proposals, however, recent amendments to Rule 23 have expanded opt-out rights. 3 One reason why the class might unravel in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action is adverse selection due to damage averaging (Co¤ee 1987; Bone 2003) . Damaging averaging occurs when the allocation rule governing the division of the net recovery of the class among its members assigns class members with below-average (above-average) claims more (less) than their pro rata shares. 4 If 1 The deontological arguments usually emphasize the concept of plainti¤ autonomy and invoke the notion that "everyone should have his own day in court" (Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) ). The instrumental arguments usually emphasize the idea that the right to opt out serves as a mechanism to mitigate the principal-agent problems inherent in class actions. For summaries of these arguments and concise reviews of the literature, see, e.g., Perino (1997) and Eisenberg and Miller (2004b) . For criticisms of these arguments, see, e.g., Rosenberg (2003) . 2 There is no universally accepted de…nition of "mass tort" litigation. Deborah Hensler, a leading class action scholar, de…nes it as "large scale personal injury or property damage litigation arising out of product use or exposure" (Hensler 2001, pp. 181-182) . The American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts de…nes it as involving "at least 100 civil tort actions arising from a single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance, each of which involves a claim in excess of $50,000 for wrongful death, personal injury or physical damage to or destruction of tangible property" (Willging 1999, pp. 8-9) . Examples of high pro…le mass tort class actions include the Agent Orange litigation, the Dalkon Shield litigation, and several asbestos cases (Co¤ee 1995; Weinstein 1995) .
the governing allocation rule engages in damage averaging, then, even if the per member expected recovery in the class action exceeds the mean expected recovery from separate actions, which may be the case if, for example, the class action enjoys economies of scale, superior prospects of prevailing at trial, or enhanced bargaining power in settlement negotiations, the amount that one or more putative class members with above-average claims can expect to recover by opting out may exceed the amount that they can expect to recover by remaining in the class action. This paper formally examines how di¤erent allocation rules in ‡uence the risk that the class will unravel in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. I focus on three allocation rules: (1) equal sharing;
(2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3) pro rata by outside options (i.e., expected claim values). I consider these rules for two reasons. First and foremost, they run the gamut of damage averaging.
Rules 1 and 3 correspond to full damage averaging and no damage averaging, respectively, while rule 2 involves partial damage averaging. 5 Second, these rules are natural and obvious candidates for "fair" allocation standards; as one commentator states in a closely related context, each rule has "immediate, though perhaps naive, appeal" (Kornhauser 1998 (Kornhauser , p. 1568 . 6 I analyze a two-stage model of class action formation in which a single defendant faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage claims. A global class action is certi…ed at the outset. In stage 1, the plainti¤s play a coalition formation game in which each plainti¤ simultaneously announces whether it will remain in the class or opt out. Stage 1 is modeled as a noncooperative game in partition function form (see, e.g., Bloch 2003; Yi 2003) . The global class is stable if the strategy pro…le in which all plainti¤s remain in the class constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. In stage 2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are resolved via either litigation or settlement. Stage 2 is modeled in the divergent expectations tradition (see, e.g., Priest and Klein 1984) .
I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation rule. The global class is asymptotically stable if the probability that it is stable converges to one as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large. I am interested in the asymptotic stability of the global class because in the situation under consideration-a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action-the number of plainti¤s presumably is large. This presumption follows not only from the fact that it is a mass tort class action, but also because certi…cation under Rule 23(b)(3) implies that the class is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
I show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class will be allocated pro rata in accordance with its members'outside options (rule 3), but that it may not be asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class will be shared equally (rule 1) or allocated pro 5 Rule 2 involves partial damage averaging in my model because plainti¤s share a common probability of prevailing at trial. It also would involve partial damage averaging if the probability of prevailing at trial were higher for plainti¤s with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with below-average claims. However, if the probability of prevailing at trial were lower for plainti¤s with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with below-average claims, then rule 2 would involve negative averaging whereby class members with below-average (above-average) claims would receive less (more) than their pro rata shares. 6 Rule 3 re ‡ects the normative standard embraced by many class action scholars (Silver 2000) , and arguably by the United States Supreme Court (Rosenberg 2003) . For a forceful economic argument in support of rule 2, see Rosenberg (2002) . rata in accordance with the members'damage claims (rule 2). For rules 1 and 2, I derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class. I also derive su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class under rules 1 and 2. In addition, I show that the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 1 necessarily implies the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 2 but not vice versa.
I …nd that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability of the global class under rule 1 is the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤s'damage claims. Generally speaking, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage claims is narrow. If the claims distribution is unimodal and has a bounded support, this implies that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 when the distribution is negatively skewed. In addition, I …nd that the magnitude of the scale bene…ts of the class action and the plainti¤s'probability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power in settlement negotiations are important determinants of the asymptotic stability of the global class under rules 1 and 2. In particular, if the scale bene…ts of a class action are high, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤s'bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. If, however, the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
In an e¤ort to understand the relative stability of the global class under the three allocation rules, I simulate the model using standard Monte Carlo methods. As compared to rule 3, I …nd that the global class is asymptotically stable about two-thirds as often under rule 2 and about a quarter as often under rule 1. The simulations also con…rm my …ndings regarding the determinants of class stability.
An important implication of my results is that selecting an allocation rule in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action generally involves a tradeo¤ between ex ante and ex post e¢ ciency. On the one hand, the risk that the class will unravel due to adverse selection generally increases with the degree of damage averaging in which the governing allocation rule engages. On the other hand, the cost of implementing an allocation rule generally decreases as the degree of damage averaging in which it engages increases (Co¤ee 1987 (Co¤ee , 1998 Silver and Baker 1998; Silver 2000) . 7 At the same time, however, my results suggest when this tradeo¤ may be avoided, e.g., when the plainti¤s' damage claims are severely negatively skewed over a very narrow range or when a class action would achieve signi…cant scale economies and the likelihood that the plainti¤s will prevail on the merits is low.
More generally, my results provide guidance regarding when and how allocation rules may be used to promote the stability of the class in Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class actions. Accordingly, they suggest criteria to attorneys and courts for structuring and approving e¢ cient allocations plans in such actions; e.g., if the proposed allocation plan is likely to destabilize the class then perhaps the court should not …nd that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" (Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C)). The results also suggest criteria for class certi…cation under Rule 23(b)(3); e.g., if no cost-e¤ective allocation rule exists under which the global class would be asymptotically stable then perhaps a class action is not "superior to other available methods for . . . e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y discusses the institutional background and related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation rule. Section 5 illustrates the stability analysis with …ve numerical examples. Section 6 presents the main results of the Monte Carlo simulations. 2 Institutional Background and Related Literature
Introduction to Class Actions and Rule 23
The class action is a procedural device pursuant to which "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). In general, the resolution of a class action binds all members of the class, including absent parties. 8 Thus, the class action forms an exception to the "principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment . . . in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process" (Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) ).
The raison d'être of the class action is e¢ ciency. Class actions can enhance e¢ ciency in several ways. A class action can solve a collective action problem in a case in which individual actions are not economically viable, thereby promoting optimal deterrence (Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Macey and Miller 1991) . When individual actions are economically viable, a class action can achieve economies of scale, thereby reducing litigation costs and promoting optimal investment in the litigation (Hay and Rosenberg 2000) , and promote uniformity in the law, thereby avoiding the social costs associated with legal inconsistency.
The historical roots of the class action run deep. Litigation by representatives of a group seeking to redress communal harms dates back medieval England (Yeazell 1987) . The modern ancestry of the class action includes the bill of peace with multiple parties, which was developed in the seventeenth century by the Court of Chancery in England (Chafee 1932 (Chafee , 1950 . In the United States, the …rst provision for class actions in federal courts, Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules, was adopted in 1843. It permitted a representative suit when the parties on either side were too numerous to be brought before the court without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays and the representative parties were su¢ cient to represent the interests of the absent parties (42 U.S. 8 For an historical analysis of the binding e¤ect of class actions on absent parties, see Hazard et al. (1998). (1 How.) lvi (1843)). 9 In 1912, Rule 48 was amended and restated as Rule 38. The revised rule succinctly provided, "When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole" (226 U.S. 659 (1912) (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Commonly known as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation (Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) ), these prerequisites echo the requirements of the former equity rules (Hensler et al. 2000) . Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having su¢ cient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plainti¤s and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
Note that although Rule 48 provided for representative suits, its last sentence enigmatically provided that the suit's resolution would not bind absent parties. A decade after the adoption of Rule 48, the Supreme Court ignored the rule's enigmatic proviso and indicated in dicta that when "a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, . . . the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court" (Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (1 How.) 288, 303 (1853) (Bronsteen and Fiss 2003, p. 1434) , but that "may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts" (Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23). When deemed appropriate by the court, a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a separate class (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B)). In addition, the court may limit the scope of a class action to one or more particular issues (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A)). In a products liability case, for example, the court may certify a class action only on the issue of the defendant's liability and require that the class members proceed individually to prove the amounts of their respective damage claims (see Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23).
Class actions maintained under
Any settlement of a certi…ed class action must be approved by the court (Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1)(A)). In order for the settlement to be binding, the court must conduct a hearing and …nd that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" (Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23). In addition, the rules provide that any class member may object to a proposed settlement and that any such objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval (Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(4); Leslie 2007).
When class actions are certi…ed in mass tort cases, they usually are certi…ed under Rule 23(b)(3) (Weinstein 1995) . The use of class actions to resolve mass tort cases, however, is highly controversial (Schuck 1995; Hensler 2001) . Moreover, judicial attitudes towards certi…cation of mass tort class actions have ebbed and ‡owed since the 1966 overhaul of Rule 23 (Co¤ee 1995; Schuck 1995; Weinstein 1995; Perino 1997; Tidmarsh 1998) . 10 Still, mass tort class actions remain relevant, including after the decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp.
1 0 The advisory notes accompanying the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 state that a "'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that signi…cant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, a¤ecting the individuals in di¤erent ways" (Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23). However, courts often disregard this comment (Wright et al. 2005 (Wright et al. , sec. 1783 ) and ocassionally expressly repudiate it (see, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 729-38 (4th Cir. 1989) 
Relation to the Literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature within law, economics, and their intersection.
Within law, this paper contributes to the vast literature on class actions. In particular, this paper adds to the legal scholarship that discusses allocations in class actions, including Morawetz (1993) , Silver and Baker (1997, 1998) , Co¤ee (1998) , Dana (2006) , Edelman et al. (2006) , and Macey and Miller (2009) . This paper closely relates and directly contributes to the small, but growing literature on the economics of class actions, which includes Kornhauser (1983 Kornhauser ( , 1998 , Che (1996) , Perino (1997) , Marceau and Mongrain (2003) , and De¤ains and Langlais (2011, 2012) . Kornhauser (1983 Kornhauser ( , 1998 and Perino (1997) model the formation of a class action as a cooperative game in characteristic function form. Kornhauser considers an "allocation of common costs" game and adopts the core of the game as the standard for a "fair" allocation. While certain of his results are comparable to results in this paper, Kornhauser focuses on how di¤erent court procedures for approving settlements (intervention rules, voting rules, and attorney compensation schemes) in ‡uence whether the class attorney and the defendant will propose a fair allocation. Perino uses a simple, three-player game to construct a series of examples that illustrate how the concept of core stability can elucidate several academic theories and real-world phenomena pertaining to class actions and opt-out rights.
Although he does not develop a general model, Perino demonstrates the usefulness of core theory for the analysis of class action dynamics. Che (1996) , Marceau and Mongrain (2003) , and De¤ains and Langlais (2011, 2012) ing. Marceau and Mongrain analyze a waiting game among multiple plainti¤s with heterogenous damage claims and examine how the degree of damage averaging in ‡uences which plainti¤ will assume the role of class representative and initiate the class action. They …nd that if there is full damage averaging, the class representative will be the plainti¤ with the lowest damage claim, while if there is less than full damage averaging, other plainti¤s may initiate the class action. De¤ains and Langlais consider a sequential entry game between two plainti¤s (high stakes and low stakes) that have been injured by the same defendant. They focus on the consequences of information externalities and information sharing for the formation of a class action, though in an extension of their model they prove one result on damage averaging that is comparable to results in this paper.
In addition, this paper draws on the litigation and settlement literature within law and economics, including, most notably, Landes (1971) , Posner (1973) , Gould (1973) , Shavell (1982) , Priest and Klein (1984) , and Hylton (2006) . A recent survey of this literature is Spier (2007) . This paper also draws on and contributes an application to the literature within economics and game theory on noncooperative games of coalition formation. Surveys of this literature are provided by Konishi et al. (1997) , Bloch (1997 Bloch ( , 2003 , and Yi (2003) .
Two-Stage Model of Class Action Formation
Consider a mass tort case involving n plainti¤s and one defendant. Let N denote the set of all plainti¤s and i denote an arbitrary plainti¤ in N . All parties are risk neutral expected wealth maximizers.
Each plainti¤ i 2 N has a damage claim i against the defendant. Each plainti¤'s damage claim is its private knowledge. However, it is common knowledge that the plainti¤s'damage claims are independent and identically distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F and a probability density function f that is strictly positive on its support set [ ; ], where 0 < < < 1.
I assume that the defendant's assets are available and su¢ cient to satisfy the damage claims of all plainti¤s. 12 At the outset, a class action on behalf of all plainti¤s is certi…ed under Rule 23(b)(3). In stage 1, each plainti¤ simultaneously announces whether it will remain in the class action or opt out pursuant to Rule 23(c). 13 Let A N denote the subset of plainti¤s that remain in the class action and let N=A denote the subset of plainti¤s that opt out. I refer to A as the class, to each plainti¤ i 2 A as a class member, and to each plainti¤ i 2 N nA as an opt-out plainti¤ . The number of class members is denoted by jAj and I refer to jAj as the class size.
Following Che (1996) , I assume that each plainti¤'s announcement is binding (i.e., no class member may opt out and no opt-out plainti¤ may rejoin the class) and that each opt-out plainti¤ must pursue its claim individually (e.g., no other class actions are maintained on behalf of opt-out 1 2 I revisit this and other key assumptions of the model in section 7. 1 3 Assuming simultaneous announcements captures the idea that a plainti¤ does not know the announcements of the other plainti¤s when it makes its announcement. 
Stage 2: Dispute Resolution
Plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle rather than litigate their dispute if a settlement range existsi.e., if plainti¤ !'s reservation price (its minimum settlement demand) is less than or equal to the defendant's reservation price (its maximum settlement o¤er):
where (i) P ! and Q ! denote the respective estimates by plainti¤ ! and the defendant of the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) C ! > 0 and K ! > 0 denote the respective litigation costs of plainti¤ ! and the defendant. 15 If no settlement range exists the parties litigate.
Condition (1) implicitly assumes that if the parties litigate and plainti¤ ! prevails at trial the defendant is liable to plainti¤ ! for its damage claim ! , 16 that the parties bear their own litigation costs, 17 and that settlement costs are zero. 18 Note that by (1), Q ! > P ! is a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for settlement and P ! > Q ! is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for litigation.
The parties estimate the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial with error. In particular, I assume that the parties'estimates are given by
where (i) W ! is the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) ! and ! represent the respective prediction errors of plainti¤ ! and the defendant. I assume that ! and ! are independently realized at the beginning of stage 2 and that each is uniformly distributed on the
The latter assumption ensures that the parties'
estimates of the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial are between zero and one (P ! 2
. This assumption also implies that the variance of the parties'prediction errors is zero at W ! = 0 and W ! = 1, when the outcome of a trial is certain, and achieves its maximum at W ! = 1 2 , when the outcome of a trial is most uncertain (cf. Priest and Klein 1984; Hylton 2006) .
Given (2) and (3), we can restate condition (1) as follows: plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle rather than litigate their dispute if
It follows that the probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle is
where F (W!) is the cumulative distribution function of (W ! ) = ! ! . 19 Conversely, the probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant litigate is 1 ! . We can infer from (4) and (5) how various factors generate litigation in the model. Condition (4) implies that litigation may result from "overoptimism" on the part of both parties (i.e., ! > 0 and ! < 0) (cf. Shavell 1982; Hylton 2006) . Equation (5) implies that the probability that the parties litigate is weakly decreasing in joint litigation costs, C ! + K ! , and weakly increasing in the litigation stakes, ! (cf. Posner 1973; Hylton 2006) . This is because F ! is nondecreasing. In addition, equation (5) implies that the probability of litigation is weakly greater the more uncertain is the outcome of a trial (cf. Priest and Klein 1984; Hylton 2006) . This is because
Stage 1: Class Formation Game
The formation of the class is modeled as a noncooperative, simultaneous move, single coalition formation game , where: (i) the set of players is the set of all plainti¤s, N ; (ii) the set of actions available to each plainti¤ is fIn; Outg; and (iii) payo¤s are described by a per-member partition
is a partition function that assigns to each class structure A a vector 2 R j A j which speci…es the expected recovery ! of each plainti¤ ! 2 A in stage 2 and (b) R is an allocation rule that maps each stage 2 expected recovery pro…le into a vector v 2 R n which speci…es the expected payo¤ v i of each plainti¤ i 2 N at stage 1.
1 9 The distribution of (W!) is derived in appendix A.
Expected Recovery
If the parties litigate, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
If the parties settle, plainti¤ ! expects to recover its minimum settlement demand, P ! ! C ! , plus its bargained-for share of the joint surplus from settlement,
I assume plainti¤ ! expects Nash bargaining over the surplus ! . Accordingly, if ! 2 [0; 1]
represents plainti¤ !'s bargaining power, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
Hence, plainti¤ !'s expected recovery in stage 2 is
Of course, this assumes plainti¤ ! has correct expectations with regard to its bargaining power ! and the probability of settlement ! . This seems reasonable insofar as the plainti¤ (or its lawyer)
has experience with or data on similar cases (cf. Priest and Klein 1984) .
Expected Payo¤s
Under any allocation rule, the expected payo¤ of each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 N nA under class structure A is simply the expected value at stage 1 of its expected recovery in stage 2. However, the expected payo¤ of each class member i 2 A under class structure A depends on the allocation rule R. I consider the following three allocation rules, each of which is de…ned in terms of the vector of expected payo¤s v it induces:
(R 2 ) Pro rata by damage claims:
(R 3 ) Pro rata by outside options:
for i 2 N nA :
Notion of Stability
The class structure A is stable if, given the announcements of the other plainti¤s, no class member could increase its expected payo¤ by opting out of the class and no opt-out plainti¤ could increase its expected payo¤ by remaining in the class. Formally, for a class member i 2 A, let A i denote the alternative class structure in which plainti¤ i opts out of the class action, i.e., 
The class structure A is externally stable if for each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 N nA its expected payo¤ under A is greater than or equal to its inside option:
The class structure A is stable if it is both internally stable and externally stable. Note that this notion of stability corresponds to the concept of pure strategy Nash equilibrium: the class structure A is stable if and only if the announcement pro…le that induces A constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game . 20
For purposes of this paper, I focus on the stability of the class structure N , which consists of the class of all plainti¤s, A = N , and no opt-out plainti¤s. I refer to N as the global class. Note that the global class is stable provided it is internally stable; it is trivially externally stable because there are no opt-out plainti¤s. I focus on the global class for two reasons. First, it is the default class structure. The global class is formed by operation of law upon certi…cation of a class action under Rule 23. Second, it presumably is the e¢ cient class structure. Class certi…cation under Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of all plainti¤s implies that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)) and that it is inappropriate to divide the global class into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4)).
In particular, I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class.
De…nition 1
The global class is asymptotically stable if and only if for every plainti¤ i 2 N , plim
According to de…nition 1, the global class is asymptotically stable if and only if the probability that it is (internally) stable converges to one as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large. 21
As noted above, I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class because the situation under consideration is a mass tort class action in which the class is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
Additional Assumptions
Symmetry. On the basis that class certi…cation under Rule 23(b)(3) implies that the plainti¤s are "similarly situated" with respect to their factual and legal claims against the defendant (Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23), I assume that: (i) each individual plainti¤ has the same litigation costs and the defendant's litigation costs are the same with respect to each individual plainti¤:
(ii) each plainti¤ has the same probability that it would prevail at trial:
(iii) each plainti¤ has the same bargaining power in settlement negotiations:
Economies of scale. Class certi…cation under Rule 23(b)(3) also implies that "a class action would achieve economies of time, e¤ort, and expense" (Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23).
Accordingly, I assume that although litigation costs are increasing in class size, per-plainti¤ litigation costs are weakly decreasing in class size, 22 but always positive:
Because the class enjoys neither a higher probability of prevailing at trial nor enhanced bargaining power in settlement negotiations, these scale bene…ts provide the key incentive in the model for plainti¤s to remain in the class action. 23 Indeed, the per-plainti¤ net recovery is weakly increasing in class size and achieves its maximum when the class includes all plainti¤s (i.e., when A = N ). Che (1996) in making this assumption, although he assumes that per-plainti¤ litigation costs are strictly decreasing in class size.
2 3 Scale economies are the basic force that attracts plainti¤s to the class action in Che's (1996) model as well.
Viability of litigation. Consistent with Che (1996) , I restrict attention to mass tort cases in which litigation is objectively viable for each plainti¤:
Accordingly, the model does not pertain to mass torts for which a class action is socially desirable because it solves a collective action problem. Rather, it pertains to mass torts for which a class action is socially desirable because it achieves economies of scale. Similarly, I assume that litigation against each plainti¤ is objectively viable for the defendant:
Asymptotic Stability of the Global Class
This section examines the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation rule. I
show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class is allocated pro rata in accordance with the members' outside options (R 3 ), but that the global class is not necessarily asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class is shared equally by the members (R 1 ) or allocated pro rata in accordance with their damage claims (R 2 ). For R 1 and R 2 , I derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class as well as su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class. In addition, I show that the asymptotic stability of the global class under R 1 necessarily implies the asymptotic stability of the global class under and R 2 but not vice versa.
Before proceeding with the analysis by allocation rule, I note the following prefatory results, which hold for every allocation rule.
Lemma 1 Take any allocation rule. . Then (1) N .
(c) De…ne (n) = max
. Then:
and
Lemma 1(a) says that an opt-out plainti¤ is less likely to settle, and therefore more likely to litigate, than the class if and only if its damage claim exceeds the average damage claim of the class members by a factor greater than the scale bene…t of the class action. Lemma 1(b) says that the member of the global class with the lowest damage claim would be more likely to settle, and therefore less likely to litigate, than the global class were that member to opt out. Lemma 1(c)(i) says that, as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that at least one plainti¤ has the maximum damage claim converges to one. Lemmas 1(c)(ii) and (iii) say that, as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that the member of the global class with the highest damage claim would be less (more) likely to settle, and therefore more (less) likely to litigate, than the global class were that member to opt out converges to one, provided that the factor by which the maximum damage claim exceeds the expected damage claim is greater (less) than the maximum scale bene…t of a class action.
Equal Sharing (R 1 )
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the asymptotic stability of the global class under equal sharing.
Proposition 1 Suppose the allocation rule is R 1 . Then the global class is asymptotically stable if and only if
The following results follow from proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose the allocation rule is R 1 . Then:
(i) the global class is asymptotically stable if C+K c+k is su¢ ciently high and is su¢ ciently low; and (ii) the global class is not asymptotically stable if C+K c+k is su¢ ciently low and either W is su¢ ciently high or is su¢ ciently low.
Corollary 1(a) implies that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability of the global class under R 1 is the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤s' damage claims. It suggests that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R 1 if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage claims is narrow. If the distribution of the plainti¤s' damage claims is unimodal, corollary 1(a) implies that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R 1 if the distribution is negatively skewed. Corollary 1(b) suggests that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R 1 if the scale bene…ts of a class action are high and the plainti¤s' bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. If the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, however, corollary 1(b) suggests that the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under R 1 if the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
Pro Rata by Damage Claims (R
2 )
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the asymptotic stability of the global class if the net recovery of the class is allocated pro rata in accordance with the members'damage claims.
Proposition 2 Suppose the allocation rule is R 2 . Then the global class is asymptotically stable if and only if
The following results follow from proposition 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose the allocation rule is R 2 . Then: 
.
(b) The global class is asymptotically stable if
(c) The global class is not asymptotically stable if C+K c+k is su¢ ciently low and either (i) W is su¢ ciently high and < C or (ii) is su¢ ciently low.
The results of corollaries 2(a) and (c) closely resemble those of corollaries 1(b)(i) and (ii). They suggest that if the scale bene…ts of a class action are high, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R 2 if the plainti¤s' bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low, and that if the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under R 2 if the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. Corollary 2(b) suggests that, irrespective of the plainti¤s'probability of prevailing at trial or bargaining power in settlement negotiations, the global class is likely to be asymptotically stable under R 2 if the maximum scale bene…ts of a class action are close to (but do not exceed) the ratio of the maximum damage claim to the expected damage claim.
It is interesting to note how the results of lemma 1 inform certain results of corollaries 1 and 2. First, corollaries 1(b)(i) and 2(a) indicate that even if the scale bene…ts of a class action are high, damage averaging may lead the global class to unravel if the plainti¤s'bargaining power in settlement negotiations is high. Lemma 1(c) suggests why: when the scale bene…ts of a class action are high, the probability of reaching a settlement (and realizing the bene…ts of their high bargaining power) is greater for opt-plainti¤s than it is for the global class. Second, corollaries 1(b)(ii) and 2(c) indicate that when the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, damage averaging may lead the global class to unravel if the plainti¤s'probability of prevailing at trial is high. Again lemma 1(c) suggests why: when the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, the probability of litigation (and realizing the bene…ts of their high probability of prevailing at trial) is greater for opt-out plainti¤s than it is for the global class.
The following proposition states that asymptotic stability of the global class under R 1 necessarily implies asymptotic stability of the global class under R 2 but not vice versa.
Proposition 3 If the global class is asymptotically stable under R 1 , then the global class is asymptotically stable under R 2 . If the global class is asymptotically stable under R 2 , however, the global class may or may not be asymptotically stable under R 1 .
Pro Rata by Outside Options (R
3 )
The following proposition states that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the class is allocated to the members pro rata in accordance with their outside options.
Proposition 4 Suppose the allocation rule is R 3 . Then the global class is asymptotically stable.
Numerical Illustrations
This section illustrates the stability results of the previous section with …ve numerical examples.
In the examples, I assume that i = X i + , where X i iid Beta( ; ). That is, I assume that i follows a Beta distribution on the interval ; with shape parameters and . Under this assumption, the expected damage claim is E[ ] = ( ) + + . Table 1 summarizes the …ve examples. In each example, the probability that the plainti¤s would prevail at trial is high (W = 0:88) and the plainti¤s'bargaining power is settlement negotiations is low ( = 0:23). The other case variables are varied across the examples to illustrate how the asymptotic stability of the global class depends on the characteristics of the case. 
Density of
Example 3 Like example 2, this example has positively skewed but narrowly ranging damage claims. The key di¤erence is that the scale bene…ts of a class action are high, which reverses the result. Now the global class is asymptotically stable under both R 1 and R 2 . 
Example 5 This example illustrates a classic case of asymptotic stability: the plainti¤s'damage claims are negatively skewed over a narrow range and the scale bene…ts of a class action are high.
The global class is asymptotically stable whether the net recovery of the class is allocated equally among the members or pro rata in accordance with the members'damage claims. It is noteworthy that here, because of the favorable shape of the claims distribution, even more modest scale bene…ts (e.g., half the assumed scale bene…ts) would lead to the asymptotic stability of the global class under both allocation rules. Density of
Mass Tort Simulations
In an e¤ort to understand the relative stability of the global class under the three allocation rules, I simulate the model using standard Monte Carlo methods. For purposes of the simulations, I
assume that i = X i + , where X i iid Beta( ; ). That is, I assume that i follows a
Beta distribution on the interval ; with shape parameters and . Figure 1 illustrates three densities of i on [1; 4] for di¤erent shape parameters ( ; ).
To simulate each mass tort, I follow eight steps/assumptions: 2. Draw and from Uniform(0; 20).
E[
This re ‡ects the standard contingency fee (Eisenberg and Miller 2004a, p. 35) .
5. c = tC, where t is drawn from Uniform(0; 1).
6. k = 2zc, where z is drawn from Beta(10; 10).
7. K = (1 + )k, where is drawn from Uniform(0; 1).
8. Draw W and from Uniform(0; 1).
I repeat steps 1-8 250,000 times to generate the raw data. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dataset.
Analyzing the dataset for class stability, I …nd that the frequency with which the global class is asymptotically stable is 0.276 under R 1 (equal sharing) and 0.693 under R 2 (pro rata by damage claims). In addition, I …nd that the frequency with which the global class is asymptotically stable under R 1 conditional on asymptotic stability under R 2 is 0.398, and that the frequency with which Loosely speaking, therefore, the results suggest that R 1 is about two-…fths as stable as R 2 which is about two-thirds as stable as R 3 .
Analyzing the dataset for the determinants of class stability, I …nd that the simulations con…rm the theoretical results in section 4. Conditional frequency tabulations con…rm the sharp results in corollaries 1(a) and 2(a) and (b): the global class is never asymptotically stable under R 1 when the expected damage claim is less than the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum damage claims (E[ ] < ), and the global class is always asymptotically stable under R 2 when the conditions set forth in corollary 2(a) or (b) are satis…ed. Additional statistical analysis reported in appendix C generally con…rms the qualitative results in corollaries 1(b)(i) and (ii) and 2(c).
More speci…cally, the analysis shows that class stability under R 1 is associated with negatively skewed claims distributions over narrow ranges and that class stability under R 1 and R 2 is associated with high scale bene…ts, low probabilities of plainti¤ prevailing at trial, and low plainti¤ bargaining power. It also highlights the nuance that when the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, class stability under R 2 is associated with high plainti¤ bargaining power.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the asymptotic stability of the global class in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action under three rules for allocating the net recovery of the class among its members: (1) equal sharing; (2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3) I show that the global class is asymptotically stable under rule 3, but may not be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2. The shape of the distribution of the plainti¤s' damage claims proves to be a key determinant of class stability under rule 1. In particular, I …nd that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage claims is narrow, which suggests that if the distribution of the plainti¤s'damage claims is unimodal then the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 if the distribution is negatively skewed. I also …nd that the scale bene…ts of the class action and the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial and their bargaining power in settlement negotiations are important determinants of class stability. Under rules 1 and 2, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable when the scale bene…ts of a class action are high and when the plainti¤s' bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. When the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤s' probability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
To supplement the theoretical analysis, I perform Monte Carlo simulations and compare the relative stability of the global class under the three allocation rules. As compared to rule 3, the global class is asymptotically stable about two-thirds as often under rule 2 and about a quarter as often under rule 1. The simulations also con…rm my …ndings regarding the determinants of class stability.
My results highlight a general tradeo¤ between ex ante and ex post e¢ ciency in selecting an allocation rule in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. The tradeo¤ exists because the governing allocation rule's degree of damage averaging is positively related to the risk that the class will unravel due to adverse selection but negatively related to the cost of implementing the allocation rule. However, the results also provide guidance regarding when this tradeo¤ may be avoided.
Accordingly, they suggest criteria to courts for evaluating whether the predominance and superiority requirements for class certi…cation are satis…ed. For example, if the plainti¤s'damage claims are positively skewed over a wide range then perhaps the court should not …nd that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions, or if even a mild degree of damage averaging is likely to destabilize the class then perhaps the court should not …nd that a class action is superior in terms of e¢ ciency. The results also suggest criteria to attorneys and courts for structuring and approving e¢ cient allocation plans. Given that class actions scholars (and presumably courts) view the standards for judicial review of class action settlements as "confused" and the numerous multifactor tests elaborated by courts as "uncertain in scope, ambiguous in meaning and unde…ned in weight" (Macey and Miller 2009, pp. 167-168) , this would appear to be a welcome contribution.
There are several ways in which this paper could be extended. First, we could relax the assumption that each opt-out plainti¤ must pursue its claim individually. This would require rede…ning the stability concept from Nash equilibrium to strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) or coalitionproof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al. 1987) . 24 Although allowing plainti¤s to form subcoalitions would make the analysis more general, 25 it is not warranted in our setting. The assumption that opt-out plainti¤ pursue their claims individually rests on two presumptions, each of which is consistent with the premise that a global class action has been certi…ed under Rule 23(b)(3). First, it presumes that no other court would certify a separate class action on behalf of some or all opt-out plainti¤s, which is consistent with the fact that the court did not deem it appropriate to divide 2 4 Informally, a strategy pro…le constitutes a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if it is immune to deviations by coalitions. A strategy pro…le constitutes a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) if it is immune to credible deviations by coalitions, i.e., coalitional deviations that themselves are immune to further deviations by subcoalitions. For formal de…nitions of SNE and CPNE, see, e.g., Bloch (2003) .
2 5 One consequence of relaxing this assumption would be that proposition 3 would no longer hold; that is, allocating the net recovery of the class to the members pro rata in accordance with their outside options would no longer ensure the asymptotic stability of the global class. the global class into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)). Second, it presumes that search costs, personal jurisdiction requirements, or other transaction costs preclude opt-out plainti¤s from maintaining one or more joinder actions under Rule 20, which is consistent with the fact that the court determined that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable" (Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
Second, we could relax the assumption that there are no externalities or spillovers across plainti¤s. In particular, we could assume that the class action is resolved …rst and that the existence or size of the class a¤ects the expected recovery of opt-out plainti¤s. 26 For example, we could assume that the class action increases the probability that opt-out plainti¤s would prevail at trial due to the potential for a factual or legal determination in favor of the class to be given preclusive e¤ect against the defendant in a subsequent individual action by an opt-out plainti¤ under the doctrine of nonmutual o¤ensive collateral estoppel. 27 We also could relax the assumptions that the defendant's assets are su¢ cient to satisfy all damage claims and that all plainti¤s have the same priority in bankruptcy. Instead, we could assume that the class action reduces the expected payo¤ for opt-out plainti¤s due to the potential that, after the resolution of the class action, the defendant will not have su¢ cient assets available to satisfy the damage claims of all opt-out plainti¤s.
Third, we could relax the symmetry assumptions. For instance, we could consider the possibility that the class may enjoy enhanced bargaining as compared to individual plainti¤s (Silver 2000; Che 2002 ). We also could imagine that a plainti¤'s bargaining power may be a function of the probability that it would prevail at trial. Lastly, we could generalize the model to cover all possible allocations rules (i.e., all degrees of damage averaging). Technically, this would entail modeling the recovery to a plainti¤ as a linear combination of his own damage claim and the average damage claim of the class. We also could modify or generalize the model to apply to or encompass other nonmandatory claim aggregation mechanisms.
2 6 We also could consider making the timing of litigation/settlement endogenous, as in Marceau and Mongrain (2003) .
2 7 Under this assumption, if the class settles or losses at trial, the probability that an opt-out plainti¤ prevails in a subsequent trial is W , but if the class prevails at trial, the probability that an opt-out plainti¤ prevails in a subsequent trial is Y > W . Accordingly, by the law of total probability, the ex ante probability that an opt-out plaintif would prevail at trial is
The class action, therefore, increases the expected payo¤ of pursuing individual litigation against the defendant, which serves to undermine the stability of the global class.
Appendix A: Distribution of (W )
U nif orm(a; b) and de…ne = " . It can be shown that the probability density function of is
It follows that the cumulative distribution function of is
1 2 ], then a = W and b = W , which implies
; 1], then a = W 1 and b = 1 W , which implies
Figures 5 and 6 depict f (W ) (z) and F (W ) (z) for W = 0:25, 0:5, and 0:75: As illustrated by …gure 5, the density of (W ) is a symmetric tent (centered at z = 0) whose peak decreases to 1 as W increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W increases from 0:5 to 1. Similarly, as illustrated by …gure 6, the distribution of (W ) is a symmetric S (through F (W ) (0) = 0:5) whose slope decreases as W increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W increases from 0:5 to 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that F (W ) (z) is continuous in W . 
n (see, e.g., Casella and Berger 2002, thm. 5.4.4) and that F ( ") 2 [0; 1) (because is the upper bound of the support set of F ). It follows that lim n!1 
Proof of proposition 1
Under R 1 , for all i 2 N ,
In addition, for all i 2 N ,
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). That is, (n) = max 1 i n i . Because (n) i and (n) i for all i 2 N , we have
By assumption (17), plim n!1 C N n = c and plim n!1
C+K . Thus,
Proof of corollary 1
because 2 [0; 1] and F (W ) (z) 2 1 2 ; 1 for z 0. It follows that 
Proof of proposition 2
Under R 2 , for all i 2 N ,
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). By the same logic set forth in the proof of proposition 1, it follows that
Proof of corollary 2
This holds if
Now if
In addition,
To see this, let C+K c+k = x. Then we have 
Proof of proposition 3
which implies
Recall that W C > 0, < E [ ] < , and 0 < c C.
It follows that
Hence, E [ ] + 1 < 
Proof of proposition 4
Under R 3 , for all i 2 N ,
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as plainti¤ (n). By the same logic set forth in the proof of proposition 1, it follows that plim n!1 v i ( N ) v i ( N i ) 0 
Appendix C: Additional Analysis of Mass Tort Simulations
Tables 3-6 and …gure 5 generally con…rm the qualitative results in corollaries 1(b)(i) and (ii) and 2(c). Table 3 reports the means of key variables for the raw data, for the dataset, and for the subsets of the dataset in which the global class is asymptotically stable under R 1 and R 2 (which subsets I label ASR 1 and ASR 2 , respectively). It also reports p-values of t-tests comparing the means in ASR1 or ASR2, as the case may be, with those in the dataset. For each of R 1 and R 2 , table 4 compares the means of key variables for the subsets of the dataset in which the global class is and is not asymptotically stable thereunder and reports p-values of t-tests comparing these means. (ratio) and (lambda) in …gure 5 show that class stability under R 1 and R 2 is associated with high scale bene…ts, low probabilities of plainti¤ prevailing at trial, and low plainti¤ bargaining power.
Finally, the the results on in table 6 highlight the nuance that when the scale bene…ts of a class action are low, class stability under R 2 is associated with high plainti¤ bargaining power. 
